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Cambridge Social Ontology: Clarification, Development and Deployment 




Social ontology—the study of the nature and basic structure of the social realm—is currently 
enjoying a period of sustained growth and development, both as a field of study in its own 
right and as a project concerned with under-labouring for a variety of different social 
scientific disciplines including economics. One of the most active streams in this area 
emanates from Cambridge and a group of researchers operating at the interface between 
social ontology and heterodox economics whose work is sometimes identified as Cambridge 
Social Ontology. The central figure in this project is Tony Lawson, whose work has provided 
much of the impetus for Cambridge Social Ontology over the last thirty years.  
This Special Issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics is intended to mark the 
contribution Lawson has made to the study of social ontology and to the application of its 
results to economics and the social sciences more widely. It does so by presenting a range of 
new papers whose authors were invited to engage with the work of Lawson and his 
colleagues in the Cambridge Social Ontology project. The intention was to encourage new 
work, whether it be critical or constructive in orientation, and thereby hopefully to advance 
the themes that Lawson has pursued over the course of his career.  
Very broadly, the greater part of Lawson’s writings are split between identifying and 
explaining the problems of mainstream economics, and contributing to the project of 
constructing a viable alternative. With respect to the former, the broad thrust of his critique is 
that the widely recognised explanatory failures and lack of realisticness of the discipline are 
ultimately due to a pervasive ontological neglect. He argues that the profession, operating 
with a flawed conception of scientific method, has been more concerned to be seen to 
conform to proper scientific method than to ensuring that its tools of analysis are appropriate 
to the nature of the material under investigation. Lawson has led the way in showing how the 
neglect of ontological issues and accompanying scientism made the failings of modern 
economics pretty much inevitable.  
The alternative, constructive programme Lawson sets out is guided by the idea that 
method and substantive theory can benefit from explicit, systematic and sustained social 
ontology. This constructive programme sees advances in method, substantive theory and 
ontology as best produced together with developments in each informing the others. 
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Lawson’s own work tackles many different aspects of social ontology. As well as 
demonstrating the viability and significance of ontological analysis of the social realm in 
general terms, Lawson offers a particular socio-ontological conception—what he calls a 
socio-philosophical ontology—concerned with accommodating all phenomena of the social 
realm. He has contrasted this account with prominent alternatives,1 and explored its 
implications for understanding methodological strategies and prominent contemporary and 
historical projects and contributions in economics (see Lawson 1997a, 2003a and 2015f). 
Most recently he has developed conceptions of certain key social existents (in his terms 
undertaken projects in socio-scientific ontology) including the corporation, money, gender, 
technology, power and institutions (see respectively, Lawson 2015d, 2016a, 2007, 2014, 
2016d and 2015c).  
Lawson has devoted considerable energy over the years to the dissemination of his ideas. 
This activity has taken various forms, including a string of publications demonstrating why 
and how ontology matters for heterodox economists, economic methodologists and historians 
of economic thought (Lawson 1992, 1994e, 1994c, 1996a, 2001e, 2004c, 2005c, 2006 and 
2015e) and setting up and leading two of the main institutions that support Cambridge Social 
Ontology, namely the Cambridge Realist Workshop and, more recently, the Cambridge 
Social Ontology Group. The Cambridge Realist Workshop has been running continuously 
since October 1990 and provides a testing ground for new research in heterodox economics, 
especially that with an explicit philosophical or methodological focus. The Cambridge Social 
Ontology Group, established in October 2002, aims more specifically to advance social 
ontology. Both initiatives have had international impact in the generation of new research.2 
As its title suggests, the collection of papers in this Special Issue aims to clarify, develop 
and deploy some of the ideas advanced by Lawson and the Cambridge group. Authors were 
asked to provide contributions in specific areas of social ontology and encouraged to build on 
topics suggested by, constructively criticize positions defended in, or apply the results of 
Lawson’s various contributions. Proposed topics included emergence, power, human 
flourishing, community, norms, rules, custom and convention, identity, uncertainty, 
                                                 
1 See especially Lawson (2015a). One of the most prominent alternatives to the Cambridge approach is that developed by 
John Searle and his colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley. The Berkeley Social Ontology Group (BSOG as it 
is known) is run on similar lines to its Cambridge counterpart, and there are close links between the two groups. See Lawson 
(2012a and 2016c) for comparison of the two programmes. 
 
2 For a brief history of the Realist Workshop and the Cambridge Social Ontology Group see Pratten (2015). For further 
background on the development of the Cambridge group see the interviews with Tony Lawson in Hirsch and DesRoches 
(2009) and Dunn (2009). 
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technology, money, gender, markets, the corporation, institutions and development. The 
papers that were submitted for the special issue all went through the usual Cambridge 
Journal of Economics review process.  
To provide some context for the papers that were accepted for publication, we begin with 
a brief overview of Lawson’s contribution in which we distinguish three broad, if sometimes 
overlapping, stages in the development of his ideas. This is followed by a section in which we 
provide short descriptions of the individual contributions, arranged in rough accordance with 
the order in which the subjects they address came to the fore in Lawson’s work. 
2. Social Ontology and the Contribution of Tony Lawson 
The first stage of Lawson’s contribution comprises two strands, one concerned with the 
labour process, (industrial) power relations (especially paternalism) and UK industrial decline 
(Kilpatrick and Lawson, 1980; Lawson 1981b), the other with the theorisation of knowledge. 
The latter strand focuses on conceptions of knowledge, the manner of its transformation, 
probability, modelling, uncertainty and expectations (Lawson 1980, 1981a, 1983, 1985a, 
1985b, 1987, 1988), as well as on processes (including paradoxes) of confirmation (Lawson 
1985c). This second, knowledge-oriented, strand is the more philosophically oriented of the 
two and while there were few explicit references to ontology at this stage, it connects most 
obviously with the work that came later.3 
The second stage of Lawson’s work marks his turn towards explicit and systematic 
ontological theorizing. While his earlier work was already critical in nature, especially with 
respect to specific forms of mathematical economic modelling, in this second stage he began 
to mount a full scale, ontologically informed, critique of mainstream economics and its 
reliance on mathematical modelling. This work also comprises two parts. The first constructs 
a socio philosophical ontology already mentioned above, an account of the general nature of 
all of social reality (Lawson 1997a, 2003a, 2012a, 2015a and 2016b). The second part shows 
that the dominant methods of mainstream economics presuppose an implicit ontology quite 
inconsistent with Lawson’s own or any realistic conception (Lawson 1997a, 1997d, 2001b, 
2001f, 2003a, 2004a, 2005b, 2005c, 2009b and 2015f). The two parts together provided the 
foundations for both his explanation of the failings of modern economics and the 
                                                 
3 From time to time Lawson has returned to the former studies as a way of illustrating particular methodological issues (see 
Lawson, 1997a, chapter 15 and 1998, 2014). 
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development of an alternative and potentially more fruitful approach to social 
theorizing/science and ethics.4 
The ensuing work has been developed in numerous directions. One has focused on 
fashioning alternative methods of analysis consistent with his social ontology, the centrepiece 
of which is a dialectical account of contrast explanation (Lawson, 2003a, chapter 4, 2008 and 
2009a). Another has focused on providing arguments for a greater integration of separate 
strands of social theorising, with a view to promoting a single social science with economics 
serving at best as a division of labour within it (Lawson, 2003a, chapter 6), And yet another 
involves various projects in the history of the discipline. These include articulating a 
programme for studying the place of ontology in the history of economic thought (see 
Lawson, 2015e and Arena and Lawson, 2015), developing a history of how economics 
arrived at its current state with mathematical methods so dominant (Lawson, 2001c, 2003a, 
chapter 10 and 2016b), and investigating and revealing the ontological presuppositions of 
earlier contributors—Kaldor, Keynes, Hayek, Menger, Veblen and Marx amongst others—
and examining the extent to which these coincide with his own account of social ontology (he 
finds the overlap is greatest with Veblen, Keynes, Marx and the later Hayek, see Lawson, 
1989a, 1985b, 1991, 1993, 1994f, 1995a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 2002, 2003e and 2015e).  
Lawson has also devoted considerable effort to examining the nature of modern heterodox 
economics (Lawson 1994a, 1994b, 2005a, 2006, 2007c), arguing that the most prominent 
contemporary heterodox traditions are broadly united in their (often implicit) ontological 
commitments, and that these are generally consistent with the social ontology he defends. 
The differences between these traditions, he argues, lie in the various emphases adopted and 
questions and concerns pursued (Lawson, 2006). There remain, however, some notable points 
of dispute on ontological matters with certain heterodox traditions. For example, while 
acknowledging how much he has learned from feminist economics, Lawson has devoted 
considerable effort to persuading feminist economists who have sought to distance 
themselves from explicit ontological theorising that they are making a mistake (Lawson, 
1999a, 2003b, 2003c). Further, he worries that the emphasis on mathematical modelling in 
                                                 
 
4 During the course of the second stage Lawson joined with others from different disciplines but working on similar lines 
under the banner of critical realism (Margret Archer in Sociology, Alan Norrie in Law, Andrew Collier and Roy Bhaskar in 
Philosophy). This group formed the Centre for Critical Realism and the International Association for Critical Realism, 
which led many to associate the work of Lawson and those linked with it as critical realism in economics (see in particular 
Fleetwood, 1999, Lewis, 2004, Downward, 2003). However, the projects pursued by Lawson and the Cambridge group on 
the one hand and those pursued within critical realism on the other developed in different ways over the years, and Lawson 
now tends to avoid the label and to argue that clarity is best served by elaborating precisely what each project involves rather 
than presuming that all fit neatly within a single homogeneous framework (see Hirsch and DesRoches 2009). 
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some parts of heterodox economics is misguided. Lawson’s recent study of Veblen’s notion 
of the term neoclassical is interesting here, where he proposes the term be interpreted as 
referring to an inconsistency between a conception of social reality that is along the lines that 
Lawson defends (as open, processual, and relational, etc.,) on the one hand, and the use of 
methods Veblen terms taxonomic that are concerned with empirical/surface regularities that 
are quite inconsistent with that conception on the other. On this interpretation, of course, 
there are heterodox economists who use the term neoclassical in a pejorative sense but are 
themselves guilty of this very inconsistency.  
In sum, then, the second stage of Lawson’s contribution is his elaboration of a broad socio-
philosophical ontology and drawing out its implications for all aspects of social theorizing.  
The third stage, consisting of his most recent and ongoing contributions, sees Lawson 
pursuing various projects in socio-scientific ontology, drawing on his account of general 
social philosophical ontology to theorise specific social existents such as money (Lawson 
2016a), gender (Lawson 2007a), trust (2001a), technology (Lawson 2014), institutions 
(Lawson 2015c), the corporation (Lawson 2015d and 2015g) and power (2012a, 2015a, 
2015d, 2016b, and especially 2016d). The guiding theme in these contributions is Lawson’s 
conception of social positioning by which people and other kinds of entities become 
positioned as components of emergent social systems or totalities, with their capacities 
harnessed to serve as functions of those systems. In developing his account of emergent 
social systems Lawson emphasises in particular the errors, as he sees them, of causal 
reductionism and versions of downward causation (see Lawson 2013 and 2013d). He places  
particular emphasis on positional power, and so of powers that are properties of systems or 
organisations.  
 
3. The papers in this special issue  
As we have already noted, the papers in this Special Issue are arranged in rough accordance 
with the order in which the subjects they address came to the fore in Lawson’s contributions. 
The overall coverage is inevitably somewhat partial and understandably the request for 
authors to engage with Lawson’s work elicited rather more papers concentrating on his most 
recent contributions. Nevertheless, taken as a whole the papers represent a collection that 
serves to highlight many of the most important themes in Lawson’s writings.  
Stage 1 - Probability and Uncertainty 
 6 
 
Lawsons’ early work on knowledge, especially probability and fundamental uncertainty 
(Lawson 1985a, 1985b, 1987, 1988, 1989b), provides the background to the first paper 
“Unknowns, Black Swans and the risk/uncertainty distinction” by Phil Faulkner, Alberto 
Feduzi and Jochen Runde. In the first part of the paper Faulkner, Feduzi and Runde develop a 
detailed conceptual framework for thinking about different kinds of uncertainty, within which 
the notions of known unknowns and unknown unknowns, associated with Donald Rumsfeld 
(2002, 2011), and Black Swans, associated with Nassim Taleb (2007), are then located and 
the links between them explored. The second part of the paper focuses on Lawson’s Keynes-
inspired interpretation of uncertainty, exploring some of the links between this and related 
notions such as weight of evidence and the ideas of Rumsfeld and Taleb (ideas never 
explicitly addressed by Lawson, or indeed Keynes or Knight). 
Stage 2 - Cambridge social ontology and its consequences 
We have seen how Lawson’s social philosophical ontology and the way he has used this to 
critique certain practices of modern economics, have grounded various different lines of 
research. Some of these lines of research are taken up in the following papers.  
Ismael Al-Amoudi and John Latsis in their paper ‘The Limits of Ontological Critique: 
from Judgemental Rationality to Rationality’ observe that whilst the Cambridge Social 
Ontology project has attracted significant attention and engagement from heterodox 
economists and those specialising in the philosophy and methodology of economics (for one 
collection bringing together such responses and Lawson’s replies, see Fullbrook, 2009), it has 
been largely ignored by mainstream economists. Why so? Al-Amoudi and Latsis suggest that 
the framework developed by the French Convention School, with its concern with notions of 
situated judgement and the construction of legitimacy, provides a compelling perspective 
from which to address this question. They argue that proponents of the Cambridge project 
need to pay more attention to how justification is constructed. This leads them to discuss in 
some detail, using the French Convention School framework, how justification proceeds in 
the Cambridge Social Ontology project and mainstream economics. The paper concludes 
with some reflections on how the critique of the mainstream could be extended and deepened. 
Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics is also the subject of Nuno Martins’ “Critical 
Ethical Naturalism and the Transformation of Economics”. Martins argues that Lawson’s 
moral theorizing provides a useful lens through which to view his attempts at transforming 
the discipline of economics. Martins begins by carefully describing Lawson’s theory of 
ethics, a position known as Critical Ethical Naturalism that is grounded in the notion that 
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morally good actions are those aimed at removing obstacles to human flourishing (see 
Lawson 2001a, 2013c, 2015b and 2017; for relevant background also see Martins, 2014). 
Having outlined the connections between this and Lawson’s broader socio-philosophical 
ontology, Martins then highlights implications of Lawson’s ethics for a number of different 
topics within the fields of meta-ethics, ethical theory and applied ethics. The last of these 
brings Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics into focus, with Martins arguing that with 
the mainstream paradigm understood as a barrier to human development we can appreciate 
his call for the wholesale transformation of economics as being wholly of a piece with his 
broader ethical, as well as ontological, framework. 
Paul Lewis’ paper “Ontology and the history of economic thought: the case of anti-
reductionism in the work of Friedrich Hayek” provides a good example of a study in the 
history of economic thought that focuses on the ontological presuppositions of a well-known 
author. Lewis traces the increasingly prominent role of the concept of emergence in the 
arguments against reductionism in Hayek’s postwar work on theoretical psychology and 
social theory. While Hayek’s opposition to reductionism was primarily on computational 
grounds in his work on theoretical psychology—based on his view about the inability of 
classificatory systems such as the mind fully to explain themselves—Lewis shows that, by 
the 1960s, Hayek was advancing a more explicitly “emergentist” case against reductionism in 
his social theory. Lewis argues that this involved the use of an increasingly sophisticated set 
of ontological categories relating to organising relations underpinning higher-level system 
properties, and which enabled Hayek to integrate important themes in his work such as the 
notions of spontaneous order and evolution.  
The contribution of Dimitris Milonakis “Formalising Economics: Social Change, Values, 
Mechanics and Mathematics in Economics Discourse” complements and provides a partial 
critique of Lawson’s history of the rise to dominance of mathematical economics. Lawson 
has specifically defended an evolutionary account of this episode (2003a, chapter 10 and 
2016b) and Milonakis explores a number of the social, economic, political and institutional 
factors involved in the process, including some which he suggests are neglected or 
downplayed in Lawson’s account. 
We noted earlier Lawson’s work on the identification of methods that are appropriate to 
investigating the nature of social reality as uncovered in his ontological analysis. In this 
regard Lawson has explored the nature of dialectical explanatory approaches and examined in 
detail the specific form that is contrast explanation (see Lawson, 2003a, chapter 4, 2008 and 
2009a). Lawson himself has considered how contrast explanation relates to certain other 
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methodological strategies focussing in particular on the links with feminist standpoint theory 
(see Lawson, 2007b).5 Morgan and Patomaki in “Contrast explanation in economics: its 
context, meaning and potential” examine Lawson’s treatment of contrast explanation in the 
context of its earlier elaboration by van Fraassen and Garfinkel. By considering the 
development of contrast explanation by others in the philosophy of science and social theory 
they highlight what is distinctive and valuable about Lawson’s approach.  
Stage 3 – Specific social existents  
The final set of papers relate to Lawson’s recent work aimed at developing systematic 
accounts of particular social existents that are consistent with his broader social ontological 
conception. As already noted, the process of social positioning is a central and distinctive part 
of Lawson’s analysis that features prominently in these more substantive accounts. 
Stephen Pratten in “Trust and the Social Positioning Process” notes that Lawson, while 
emphasizing the importance of trust and describing it as the glue binding society together, has 
yet to set out his account of trust as systematically as he has other categories associated with 
his ontological framework. Pratten considers three phases of argumentation where Lawson 
focuses on trust, shows that a consistent and coherent account of trust emerges and also 
identifies certain complementary perspectives that could be drawn upon to develop Lawson’s 
account further. 
In “Materialising Social Ontology” Dave Elder-Vass considers the role of (non-human) 
material entities – essentially physical objects and devices – in the ontology of larger social 
structures. Drawing on the work of Tony Lawson (Lawson 2012a) and particularly that of 
Lawson’s Cambridge colleagues Phil Faulkner and Jochen Runde (2009, 2013a, and 2013b) 
and Clive Lawson (2007, 2008, 2010 and 2017), Elder-Vass theorises what he calls “socio-
technical structures”, whereby material entities and human beings combine to form systems 
whose causal powers depend jointly on the causal powers of their component parts and the 
relations and interactions between those parts. In addition to the aforementioned Cambridge 
contributors, Elder-Vass also contrasts aspects of his account with the work of Wanda 
Orlikowski, Bruno Latour and Manuel DeLanda. 
John Searle, in a paper entitled “Money: ontology and deception”, provides his most 
substantial discussion yet of the place of money within his well-known theory of social 
reality (see especially Searle, 1995 and 2010). While much of what Searle has to say about 
                                                 
5 This discussion of the links between contrast explanation and standpoint theory is just one element of a much broader 
engagement with feminist theory, see Lawson, 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2007a. 
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the functions and “deceptions” of money will be familiar to economists, he goes deeper than 
standard economic accounts by proposing a set of conditions, none of which involve 
monetary concepts, that are required for a community to have the institution of money and for 
an individual within that community to have a certain amount of money. He goes on to 
provide a critical commentary on Lawson’s recent account of the nature of money published 
in this journal (Lawson 2016a) in an Appendix to the paper.  
Lawson’s recent work on the nature of money is also the focus of Mark Peacock’s paper 
“The Ontology of Money”. Here Peacock explores the compatibility between Lawson’s 
account and credit theories of money, homing in especially on what credit theorists might 
make of Lawson’s contention that monetary notes and coins are most appropriately classified 
as being other than money “proper”. Peacock also reflects on the historical example of 
tobacco money that Lawson draws on when considering the need to accommodate the 
commodity theory within a broader analysis of the ontology of money.     
The following two papers critically engage with Lawson’s account of the modern 
corporation (Lawson 2015d and 2015g). Jeroen Veldman and Hugh Wilmott in “Social 
Ontology and the Corporation” maintain that the social ontology of the modern corporation is 
radically contingent and inescapably contested. They explore the coherence of Lawson’s 
argument that the corporation is a community that goes through a complex process of 
multiple positioning, suggesting that he pays insufficient attention to the corporation and the 
separate legal entity as social constructs.  
Simon Deakin in “Tony Lawson’s Theory of the Corporation: Towards a Social Ontology 
of Law” takes the recent exchange between Tony Lawson and John Searle over the nature of 
the corporation as a starting point and considers how ontological analysis can be useful in 
resolving long standing debates regarding the nature of business firms and the way they are 
structured by legal concepts. Deakin argues that further progress with clarifying the nature of 
the corporation requires the elaboration of a social ontology of the legal system itself.   
The special issue closes with Doug Porpora’s paper “Tony Lawson from a Sociological 
Point of View”. Here Porpora spells out what he regards as some of Lawson’s seminal 
contributions and then uses these as a backdrop against which to explore two issues that 
according to Porpora look rather different from a sociological point of view. The first 
concerns questions of methodology, specifically Lawson’s notion of demi-regs and his views 
on the usefulness of analytical statistics in social research (an issue on which Porpora and 
Lawson disagree). The second concerns Lawson’s social ontology. Here Popora revisits and 
revises earlier arguments he had made about Lawson being too subjectivist in the sense of 
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overemphasizing intersubjective relations of which actors are aware at the expense of what 
Popora, following Lenin (1970), calls material relations that exist independently of actors’ 
awareness. Porpora agrees with Lawson that material relations are less ontologically 
fundamental than Lawson’s rights and obligations, but maintains that they may be equally 
important causally and therefore deserving of a more prominent role than they are given in 
Lawson’s social ontology.  
4. Conclusion  
The central message in Tony Lawson’s writings is that ontology is unavoidable in science 
and that explicit and sustained attention to ontology is a pressing need within the social 
sciences, and economics in particular. No one has done more to drive these points home. As 
Edward Fullbrook (2009: 1) has observed:  
“[Tony Lawson’s] chapter, “A Realist Theory for Economics”, published in [a 
...] 1994 landmark collection New Directions in Economics Methodology, [an 
edited volume containing papers by the most prominent contributors of the 
time] stands out like someone standing alone at a party. As recently as then 
the ideas of three thinkers, none of them economists, none social scientists and 
all of them dead, dominated economics’ literature on methodology. The index 
[to the collection] lists 47 pages that refer to Thomas Kuhn, 69 to Karl Popper 
and 73 to Imre Lakatos. Twelve of the book’s sixteen chapters (excluding 
Lawson’s) refer to one or more of the three and eight, as well as the back 
cover, to all three. Lawson does not refer to any of them. More significant, 
Lawson’s key reference point is ontology, a word that, except in the 
Introduction when [the volume’s editor] is introducing his collection’s odd 
man out, appears in none of the other chapters. Notably, when Lawson first 
uses “ontology” he feels it necessary, despite his highly specialized audience, 
to explain what the word means: …. 
 Thirteen years later and anyone in economics who knows anything about 
methodology knows what “ontology” means.” (Edward Fullbrook, 2009: 1) 
 
Substantial encouragement can be taken from the greater awareness of ontology highlighted 
by Fullbrook, as well as the many advances in social ontology made over the last thirty years 
that are having an increasing impact in economics and throughout social theory more widely. 
Nevertheless there is still work to be done. Of most concern, perhaps, is the continued 
reluctance of mainstream economics to even acknowledge, let alone engage in and recognise 
the significance of, ontological arguments. It is then difficult for the kind of arguments 
Lawson has made against the mainstream, highlighting the mismatch between its methods 
and subject matter, to find much purchase. And this last problem is not limited to the 
mainstream: there are heterodox economists who continue to favour methods that seem at 
variance with ontological insights they themselves would recognise. 
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In the midst of all this Lawson remains resolute in arguing that the goal of an efficacious 
and ultimately emancipatory discipline of economics, one grounded in the results of the kind 
of explicitly ontologically-oriented project he has pursued over the years, remains feasible. 
We hope that the papers published in this issue—both those generally supportive as well as 
those critical of aspects of Lawson’s approach—will be a small contribution towards this goal 
and demonstrate the centrality of social ontology for the productive transformation of 
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